Ransomware: Effective Analysis and Prevention Strategies

Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts user files and demands a ransom payment to decrypt them. It has become an increasingly popular attack vector for cybercriminals, as it can be lucrative and difficult to defend against. In this article, we will discuss the inner workings of ransomware, analyze some real-world examples, and provide techniques to prevent and mitigate ransomware attacks.

For related malware analysis content, explore our coverage of advanced malware analysis techniques and ransomware prevention in cloud environments.

Ransomware Analysis

#

Ransomware is a type of malware that is designed to encrypt files on a victim’s machine and demand payment in exchange for the decryption key. Ransomware can be classified into two main categories: locker ransomware and encryption ransomware. Locker ransomware, also known as scareware, restricts access to the infected machine by displaying a full-screen message that demands payment to unlock it, often using psychological manipulation to pressure the victim. This type of ransomware is less prevalent than encryption ransomware, which encrypts files on the infected machine and demands payment for the decryption key. Encryption ransomware is more commonly encountered in the wild, as it can lead to significant financial gain for cybercriminals.

Ransomware is typically distributed through phishing emails, malvertising, or exploit kits that target software vulnerabilities. Common delivery vectors include email attachments that contain malicious macros, malicious PDFs, or links to infected websites. Once the ransomware is executed, it will start encrypting the victim’s files or block the system’s access. The ransomware will then display a message on the screen, usually in the form of a pop-up window, that demands payment in exchange for the decryption key.

Malware analysts use various tools and techniques to analyze ransomware and understand its behavior. The first step in ransomware analysis is to acquire the malware sample, which can be done through various methods, including network traffic capture, disk image acquisition, or file extraction from a system. Tools like VirusTotal can also assist in sample acquisition by checking files against a large database of known malware.

Once the malware sample is acquired, the analyst can start analyzing its behavior. One of the common techniques used in ransomware is code obfuscation, which is used to hide the malware’s malicious behavior and evade detection by security software. Code obfuscation can be achieved through various techniques, including packing, encryption, and polymorphism.

Packing is a technique used to compress the malware code and embed it into a wrapper that can unpack and execute the code at runtime. Packing makes the malware code harder to detect by antivirus software and static analysis tools. An analyst can use a disassembler tool, such as IDA Pro, to unpack the code and analyze it.

Encryption is another technique used to obfuscate malware code. In this technique, the malware author encrypts the malware code using a unique key that is only known to the malware. The malware code is then decrypted at runtime to execute the malicious behavior. An analyst can use a debugger tool, such as x64dbg, to monitor the malware execution and capture the decrypted code.

Polymorphism is a technique used to generate multiple variants of the malware code, making it harder to detect by antivirus software and static analysis tools. Polymorphism can be achieved through various techniques, including code obfuscation, code transformation, and mutation. An analyst can use a sandbox environment, such as the Cuckoo Sandbox project, to execute the malware and capture its behavior.

Another technique used in ransomware is anti-debugging and anti-analysis. This technique is used to prevent malware analysts from analyzing the malware’s behavior by detecting the presence of debugging and analysis tools. Anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques can be achieved through various methods, including API hooking, code obfuscation, and rootkit installation.

Ransomware authors use various encryption algorithms to encrypt victim’s files, including RSA, AES, and Blowfish. RSA is a public-key cryptosystem that is widely used in secure communications. In RSA, the encryption key is public and can be freely distributed, while the decryption key is private and only known to the owner. Ransomware authors use RSA to generate a unique encryption key for each victim, which is encrypted with the RSA public key embedded in the malware.

AES is another encryption algorithm used in ransomware. AES is a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses a shared key to encrypt and decrypt data. Ransomware authors use AES to encrypt victim’s files with a shared key, which is then encrypted with the RSA public key.

Blowfish is another encryption algorithm used in ransomware. Blowfish is a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses a shared key to encrypt and decrypt data. Ransomware authors use Blowfish to encrypt victim’s files with a shared key, which is then encrypted with the RSA public key.

To analyze the encryption algorithm used by ransomware, malware analysts can use various tools, including a debugger, disassembler, and memory dump analysis tools, such as Volatility. The analyst can monitor the encryption process by setting breakpoints at key functions, capturing the data before and after encryption, and analyzing the encryption algorithm used.

Ransomware authors use various techniques to demand payment from the victim, including Bitcoin, gift cards, and wire transfers. Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency used in ransomware attacks, as it allows for anonymous transactions and cannot be easily traced. Ransomware authors typically provide the victim with a Bitcoin address to send the payment to, and once the payment is received, they provide the victim with the decryption key.

Gift cards and wire transfers are also used by ransomware authors to demand payment. Gift cards are a popular payment method for ransomware authors, as they can be easily purchased anonymously and are difficult to trace. Ransomware authors typically provide the victim with a gift card code to redeem in exchange for the decryption key. Wire transfers are also used by ransomware authors, although they are less common due to the difficulty of remaining anonymous.

In addition to demanding payment, ransomware authors often use other techniques to increase the likelihood of the victim paying the ransom. These techniques include displaying a countdown timer that increases the pressure on the victim to pay, threatening to increase the ransom amount if payment is not made within a certain timeframe, and threatening to leak sensitive data if payment is not not made.

The Evolution: Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)

#

The most significant shift in the ransomware landscape is the adoption of the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. Just like SaaS changed the software industry, RaaS has professionalized cybercrime.

The Business Model

#

RaaS divides the labor between two distinct groups:

1. Operators (Developers): They write the malware, maintain the payment infrastructure (Tor sites), manage the decryption keys, and handle negotiations. They take a cut (usually 20-30%) of every ransom paid.
2. Affiliates (Pentesters): They are responsible for breaching the victim’s network, deploying the ransomware, and exfiltrating data. They keep the largest share (70-80%).

This model lowers the barrier to entry. An affiliate doesn’t need to know C++ or encryption math; they just need to know how to phish, use Metasploit, or buy access from an Initial Access Broker (IAB).

Double Extortion

#

Traditional ransomware just encrypted files. If you had backups, you could restore and ignore the demand. To counter this, groups like Maze (pioneers of this tactic) introduced Double Extortion:

1. Exfiltrate: Before encrypting, the attacker steals sensitive data (financials, PII, trade secrets).
2. Encrypt: They lock the systems.
3. Threaten: The ransom note demands payment for the decryptor and to prevent the data from being leaked on a public “Shame Site” DLS (Data Leak Site).

Even with perfect backups, the threat of a GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) fine, lawsuit, or reputation damage forces many companies to pay.

Triple Extortion

#

Some groups have escalated to Triple Extortion, adding Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against the victim’s public-facing infrastructure to increase pressure during negotiations.

Real-World Examples

#

Let’s take a look at some real-world examples of ransomware attacks:

WannaCry

#

WannaCry was a global ransomware attack that occurred in May 2017. It exploited a vulnerability in the Windows operating system to spread across the internet. Once a system was infected, WannaCry would encrypt the victim’s files and demand a ransom payment in Bitcoin. WannaCry is estimated to have affected over 200,000 systems in 150 countries, with total damages estimated at over $4 billion.

The WannaCry ransomware used the EternalBlue exploit to target a vulnerability in the Microsoft Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. The vulnerability allowed the ransomware to spread rapidly across the internet without user interaction. The ransomware also used a custom implementation of the DoublePulsar backdoor to persist on infected systems.

A notable feature of the WannaCry outbreak was the discovery of a “kill switch” by security researcher Marcus Hutchins. The malware would check for the existence of a specific, unregistered domain before executing its encryption routine. Hutchins registered the domain, inadvertently halting the spread of the ransomware. This event highlighted the importance of rapid analysis and collaboration in responding to large-scale cyberattacks. You can read more about it in this article on Wired.

Petya/NotPetya

#

Petya/NotPetya was a ransomware attack that occurred in June 2017. It spread rapidly across the internet using a worm-like mechanism to infect vulnerable systems. Once a system was infected, Petya/NotPetya would encrypt the victim’s files and demand a ransom payment in Bitcoin. Petya/NotPetya caused significant damage to businesses, including shipping giant Maersk, which reported losses of over $300 million. Notably, NotPetya is now believed to have been a wiper disguised as ransomware. A wiper is a type of malware designed to permanently delete or overwrite data on a victim’s system, often with no intention of providing a decryption key.

Petya/NotPetya used multiple techniques to infect and spread across vulnerable systems. It exploited the same SMB vulnerability as WannaCry, but also used a second exploit known as EternalRomance to spread across networks. Petya/NotPetya also used a modified version of the Mimikatz tool to extract credentials from infected systems and propagate to other systems on the network.

LockBit 3.0 (Black)

#

LockBit is currently the most prolific RaaS operation. Version 3.0 (released in 2022) introduced several advanced features:

• Anti-Analysis: The binary requires a password argument to run. Without it, the code is encrypted and will not execute or unpack in a sandbox. Example usage: lockbit.exe -k 12345abcdef
• Bug Bounty: LockBit announced a bug bounty program, offering to pay researchers for finding vulnerabilities in their own malware or website.
• Configurability: Affiliates can customize the ransomware behavior (network propagation, specific services to kill) via a YAML-like config file.

BlackCat / ALPHV

#

BlackCat was the first major ransomware family written in Rust. This choice offers several advantages:

• Cross-Platform: Easily compiled for Windows, Linux, and ESXi.
• Evasion: Rust binaries are harder to reverse engineer than C/C++ or C# due to their complex structure and standard library inclusion.
• Performance: Extremely fast encryption speeds using modern multi-threading.

BlackCat uses a unique access token system for its negotiation chat, preventing researchers or journalists from snooping on victim negotiations.

Prevention and Mitigation Techniques

#

Preventing ransomware attacks requires a layered defense strategy that includes both technical and non-technical controls. Here are some key prevention and mitigation techniques:

1. Patching and Vulnerability Management

   Keeping software up-to-date is critical for preventing ransomware attacks, as attackers often exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated software to gain access to the victim’s system. Regularly applying patches to software and systems is crucial to ensure vulnerabilities are mitigated before attackers can take advantage of them.

2. Email Filtering

   Email filtering can help prevent ransomware attacks by blocking malicious emails before they reach the user’s inbox. Email filters can be configured to block emails that contain suspicious attachments, links, or keywords. Filtering at the email gateway, where incoming emails are processed, is an effective method for blocking malicious emails.

3. Antimalware and Endpoint Protection

   Antimalware software can help prevent ransomware attacks by detecting and blocking malicious files before they can execute. It is essential to use reputable antimalware software and keep it up-to-date. Endpoint protection solutions can also be used to block malicious activities and prevent unauthorized changes to system files.

4. User Education and Awareness

   User education is critical for preventing ransomware attacks, as users are often the weakest link in the security chain. Users should be educated on how to recognize and avoid phishing emails, suspicious attachments, and links. Regular training and awareness programs can help users stay vigilant and identify potential ransomware attacks.

5. Backup and Recovery

   Regular backups are the most effective way to mitigate the impact of ransomware attacks. By maintaining up-to-date backups of critical data, it is possible to restore systems and files to a previous state without paying the ransom. Backups should be stored securely, and recovery procedures should be regularly tested to ensure they work correctly.

6. Application Whitelisting and Privilege Limiting

   Implementing application whitelisting and limiting administrative privileges are important steps in endpoint hardening, helping to prevent unauthorized software from executing and reducing the attack surface.

The Virtualization Front: ESXi Ransomware

#

Enterprises have moved to virtualization, and ransomware has followed. Attacks against VMware ESXi servers are devastating because encrypting one physical server takes down dozens of virtual machines.

ESXiArgs was a massive campaign in early 2023 targeting unpatched ESXi servers. Unlike Windows ransomware, it uses shell scripts and native Linux binaries.

Typical Kill Chain:

1. Exploit vulnerability (for example OpenSLP heap overflow CVE-2021-21974).
2. Gain root shell.
3. Kill VMs (esxcli vm process kill).
4. Encrypt .vmdk, .vmx, and .vmem files using openssl or a custom binary.
5. Replace /etc/motd (Message of the Day) with the ransom note.

Defense:

• Patch: Apply ESXi security updates immediately.
• Disable SLP: If not needed, disable the Service Location Protocol.
• Isolation: ESXi management interfaces should never be exposed to the internet.
• TPM: Use Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) and Secure Boot to verify the boot chain.

Advanced Ransomware Analysis Techniques

#

Memory Forensics in Ransomware Investigations

#

Memory analysis provides crucial insights during active ransomware infections:

# Volatility for ransomware memory analysis
python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw windows.pslist
python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw windows.dlllist
python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw windows.handles

# Extract encryption keys from memory
python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw windows.hashdump
python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw windows.cachedump

Behavioral Analysis Patterns

#

File System Monitoring

#

Ransomware exhibits characteristic file access patterns:

• Sequential Encryption: Files encrypted in alphabetical or chronological order
• Extension Modification: Mass renaming with new extensions (.encrypted, .locked)
• Metadata Preservation: Original timestamps often maintained
• Size Changes: Predictable file size increases due to encryption overhead

Network Communication Signatures

#

# Monitor for C2 beaconing patterns
tcpdump -i eth0 -w ransomware_traffic.pcap host malicious_domain.com

# Analyze encryption traffic patterns
tshark -r ransomware_traffic.pcap -Y "tls.handshake" -T fields -e tls.handshake.random

Automated Analysis Frameworks

#

YARA Rules for Ransomware Detection

#

rule Ransomware_Generic {
    meta:
        description = "Generic ransomware detection"
        author = "Security Researcher"

    strings:
        $encrypt_ext = ".encrypted" wide
        $ransom_note = "Your files have been encrypted" wide
        $bitcoin_addr = /[13][a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}/

    condition:
        2 of ($encrypt_ext, $ransom_note, $bitcoin_addr)
}

Sandbox Analysis Automation

#

import pefile
import yara
import hashlib

class RansomwareAnalyzer:
    def __init__(self, sample_path):
        self.sample_path = sample_path
        self.analysis_results = {}

    def static_analysis(self):
        """Perform static analysis of ransomware sample"""
        with open(self.sample_path, 'rb') as f:
            data = f.read()

        # Calculate hashes
        self.analysis_results['md5'] = hashlib.md5(data).hexdigest()
        self.analysis_results['sha256'] = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()

        # PE analysis
        try:
            pe = pefile.PE(data=self.sample_path)
            self.analysis_results['imports'] = [entry.dll for entry in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT]
            self.analysis_results['sections'] = [section.Name.decode().rstrip('\x00') for section in pe.sections]
        except:
            self.analysis_results['pe_analysis'] = 'Failed'

        return self.analysis_results

    def behavioral_analysis(self, sandbox_report):
        """Analyze sandbox execution results"""
        indicators = []

        # Check for encryption operations
        if 'file_encryption' in sandbox_report:
            indicators.append('File encryption detected')

        # Network communications
        if sandbox_report.get('network_connections', []):
            indicators.append('Network communication detected')

        # Anti-analysis techniques
        if sandbox_report.get('anti_debugging'):
            indicators.append('Anti-analysis techniques detected')

        return indicators

Technical Deep Dive: Reversing with Ghidra

#

Let’s walk through the process of analyzing a ransomware sample using the NSA’s open-source tool, Ghidra.

Step 1: Import and Basic Analysis

#

Load the malicious PE (Portable Executable) file into Ghidra. Run the automated analysis. Look at the Import Table. Ransomware needs specific APIs:

• CryptEncrypt, CryptGenKey (Cryptography)
• FindFirstFile, FindNextFile (File System Traversal)
• WNetOpenEnum, WNetEnumResource (Network Share Enumeration)
• EmptyRecycleBin (Deletion)

Step 2: Identifying the Main Routine

#

Search for strings like “shadow”, “vssadmin”, or ransom note text. Click on the reference to jump to the code that uses it. Usually, you will find a function that calls vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet. This is often the precursor to the encryption loop.

Step 3: Analyzing the Encryption Loop

#

Find the function that calls FindFirstFile. It will likely loop through files. Inside the loop, look for a function call that takes the file handle or content. This is likely the encryption routine.

• Check for Exclusions: Most ransomware avoids encrypting windows, program files, and appdata to keep the OS stable enough to pay the ransom. You will see string comparisons checking against these folder names.
• Key Generation: Look for CryptGenKey or calls to Rand(). Does it generate a key per file (stronger) or one key per session?

Step 4: Extracting the Config

#

Modern RaaS payloads often have an embedded JSON or encrypted configuration block containing:

• C2 domains
• The affiliate ID (who gets paid)
• The public key
• Service kill lists

In Ghidra, look for large blocks of high-entropy data in the .data or .rdata sections. You might need to reverse the decryption routine (often simple XOR or RC4) to read it.

Ransomware Economics and Attribution

#

Business Model Analysis

#

RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service)

#

Modern ransomware operations follow software-as-a-service models:

• Affiliate Programs: Developers provide tools, affiliates execute attacks
• Revenue Sharing: 70/30 or 80/20 splits between developers and affiliates
• Technical Support: Developers provide updates and assistance
• Marketing: Affiliates handle target selection and negotiation

Payment Trends

#

• Cryptocurrency Evolution: From Bitcoin to Monero for better anonymity
• Payment Portals: Dedicated Tor sites for ransom negotiations
• Escalation Tactics: Increasing ransom amounts over time
• Insurance Targeting: Specifically targeting organizations with cyber insurance

Attribution Challenges

#

False Flag Operations

#

Attackers attempt to misattribute their activities:

• Code Similarities: Intentionally similar code to confuse attribution
• Language Choices: Using languages associated with different regions
• Infrastructure Mixing: Using servers from multiple geographic regions

Intelligence-Driven Attribution

#

Combining multiple data sources for accurate attribution:

• Code Analysis: Unique code patterns and development habits
• Infrastructure: Server configurations and hosting patterns
• Linguistic Analysis: Error messages and ransom notes in native languages
• Financial Tracking: Cryptocurrency transaction analysis

Emerging Ransomware Threats

#

Linux Ransomware Variants

#

Linux systems increasingly targeted:

# Example Linux ransomware encryption routine
encrypt_file() {
    openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -salt -in "$1" -out "$1.encrypted" -k "$ENCRYPTION_KEY"
    rm "$1"
}

IoT and Embedded Device Ransomware

#

IoT ransomware poses unique challenges:

• Resource Constraints: Limited processing power for encryption
• Connectivity Issues: Intermittent network access
• Firmware Updates: Exploiting update mechanisms for infection

Supply Chain Ransomware

#

Attacking software supply chains:

• Dependency Poisoning: Malicious packages in open-source repositories
• Build Process Compromise: Tampering with CI/CD pipelines
• Third-Party Library Abuse: Exploiting vulnerable dependencies

Recovery and Decryption Strategies

#

File Recovery Techniques

#

Shadow Copy Exploitation

#

# Windows Shadow Copy recovery
vssadmin list shadows
vssadmin list shadowstorage
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\C:\Users\file.txt C:\Recovered\

Memory-Based Recovery

#

# Volatility for memory-based file recovery
python vol.py -f memory.dmp windows.dumpfiles --dump-dir ./recovered/

Decryption Approaches

#

Key Recovery from Memory

#

def extract_keys_from_memory(memory_dump):
    """Extract encryption keys from memory dumps"""
    # Look for common key patterns
    key_patterns = [
        rb'[0-9a-fA-F]{32}',  # 128-bit keys
        rb'[0-9a-fA-F]{64}',  # 256-bit keys
    ]

    potential_keys = []
    with open(memory_dump, 'rb') as f:
        data = f.read()

    for pattern in key_patterns:
        matches = re.findall(pattern, data)
        potential_keys.extend(matches)

    return list(set(potential_keys))  # Remove duplicates

Brute Force Decryption

#

import itertools
import string
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet

def brute_force_decrypt(encrypted_data, max_length=8):
    """Brute force decryption for weak keys"""
    charset = string.ascii_letters + string.digits

    for length in range(1, max_length + 1):
        for candidate in itertools.product(charset, repeat=length):
            key_candidate = ''.join(candidate).encode()

            try:
                # Try different key formats
                for key_format in [Fernet, lambda k: k]:
                    if key_format == Fernet:
                        f = Fernet(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(key_candidate.ljust(32, b'\x00')))
                        decrypted = f.decrypt(encrypted_data)
                        return decrypted.decode()
            except:
                continue

    return None

Future Ransomware Trends

#

AI-Powered Ransomware

#

Machine learning integration:

• Target Selection: AI identifies high-value targets with weak security
• Encryption Optimization: Adaptive algorithms based on file types
• Anti-Detection: ML-based evasion of security controls

Quantum-Resistant Encryption

#

Preparing for quantum computing threats:

• Algorithm Migration: Moving from RSA to lattice-based cryptography
• Hybrid Approaches: Combining classical and quantum-resistant methods
• Key Size Considerations: Larger keys for quantum resistance

Regulatory and Legal Developments

#

International Cooperation

#

• Information Sharing: Enhanced cross-border intelligence sharing
• Asset Recovery: International efforts to seize cryptocurrency
• Attribution Standards: Developing norms for public attribution

Insurance Industry Response

#

• Policy Adjustments: Requiring specific security controls
• Premium Adjustments: Risk-based pricing models
• Recovery Support: Integrated incident response services

Comprehensive Prevention Framework

#

Zero-Trust Implementation

#

# Example zero-trust policy configuration
apiVersion: security.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: zero-trust-ransomware
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: critical-data
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress:
    - from:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              app: authorized-service
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 443
  egress:
    - to:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              app: backup-service
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 443

Automated Response Systems

#

class RansomwareIncidentResponder:
    # ... (existing code) ...

The Incident Response Playbook

#

When the ransom note appears, panic is the enemy. Follow this structured response phase:

Phase 1: Containment (The “Golden Hour”)

#

1. Disconnect: Physically unplug infected systems from the network. Disable Wi-Fi.
2. Isolate: Segment the VLANs. If the attack is spreading via Domain Controllers, you may need to take the forest offline.
3. Preserve: Do not reboot or power off infected machines if possible. RAM contains encryption keys and evidence. Use suspend or leave them running disconnected.

Phase 2: Analysis & Scope

#

1. Identify the Variant: Upload the ransom note or an encrypted file to ID Ransomware.
2. Trace the Entry: How did they get in? RDP? Phishing? VPN exploit? If you don’t patch the hole, they will come back while you are restoring.
3. Scope the Damage: What data was exfiltrated? Check firewall logs for large outbound transfers.

Phase 3: Eradication & Recovery

#

1. Rebuild: Never trust an infected machine. Wipe and re-image from bare metal.
2. Restore: Restore from offline/immutable backups.
3. Verify: Scan the restored data. Attackers often stay dormant for weeks; your backups might contain the backdoor.
4. Reset: Force a global password reset. Rotate all service account credentials and Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (KRBTGT) keys.

Conclusion

#

Ransomware represents one of the most sophisticated and financially motivated cyber threats facing organizations today. Understanding its inner workings—from encryption algorithms and distribution methods to payment systems and attribution challenges—is crucial for both defensive and offensive security professionals.

The techniques and strategies discussed in this comprehensive analysis provide a foundation for understanding, detecting, and mitigating ransomware threats. From basic prevention measures like regular patching and user education to advanced analysis techniques involving memory forensics and behavioral pattern recognition, a layered defense approach is essential.

As ransomware continues to evolve, so too must our defensive and analytical capabilities. The integration of AI, quantum-resistant cryptography, and international cooperation will shape the future of ransomware defense. Organizations that invest in comprehensive security programs, maintain robust backup strategies, and stay informed about emerging threats will be best positioned to withstand these attacks.

Remember that ransomware defense is not just a technical challenge, but also a business continuity and risk management imperative. By understanding the adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, we can build more resilient systems and reduce the impact of these inevitable attacks.

Stay vigilant, stay prepared, and continue to advance the field of cybersecurity through research, collaboration, and innovation. The battle against ransomware is ongoing, but with knowledge and preparation, we can minimize its impact and continue to protect our digital assets.

References

#

• No More Ransom Project
• ID Ransomware
• CISA Ransomware Guide
• VirusTotal
• Ghidra
• LockBit 3.0 Analysis by Trend Micro
• MITRE ATT&CK - Ransomware